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Regulation of U.S. Oil Imports
ROBERT D.R. DE SUGNY*
INTRODUCTION
The importation of oil, into the United States is regulated
by the Department of Energy (DOE) through the Mandatory
Oil Import Program (MOIP). The MOIP was created in March
1959 by Presidential Proclamation 3279 and has undergone
substantial modifications in the intervening years. 2 The pur-
pose of the MOIP is to reduce the threat to the national secu-
rity posed by the dependence by the U.S. on foreign sources of
oil, which are subject to the threat of interruption, and to foster
the development of domestic energy sources and refining ca-
pacity.
3
Proclamation 3279 was issued pursuant to the authority
now embodied in section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974.1 Section 232(b)
provides that, upon an investigation and finding by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury that a commodity is entering the country
"in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten
to impair the national security," the President "shall take such
action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of .. .[the] article and its derivatives so that . . .
imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the na-
tional security."5 Such an investigation and finding with re-
* Staff Attorney, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. B.A.
(Hons.), 1974, University of Maryland; J.D., 1977, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. In this article "oil" is defined to include crude oil and partially refined and
finished products, whether derived from crude oil, coal, or natural gas. Presidential
Proclamation 3279, as amended, encompasses all of these materials under the term
"crude oil, unfinished oils and finished products," each of which is further defined in
the Proclamation.
2. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 1862, at 542 (1976).
3. Id.
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976) (corresponds to Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 437, as amended by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 127(d), 88 Stat. 1993).
5. Id. § 1862(b).
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spect to "petroleum and petroleum products" was made in
1959 and formed the basis for the quota/allocation system es-
tablished by Presidential Proclamation 3279.6 In 1975, another
national security investigation was conducted and the findings
which resulted therefrom were incorporated with the prior find-
ings in Presidential Proclamation 4341, which imposed the sup-
plemental import fee. 6 '
SCOPE OF THE SECTION 232 AUTHORITY
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act authorizes the
President to take "such action . as he deems necessary" to
adjust imports.7 The authority was broadly construed by the
Supreme Court in FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., which upheld
the President's authority to impose license fees." Throughout
the decision, the Court cited with approval those portions of
the legislative history which would support the widest possible
interpretation of the President's authority, such as Senator
Millikin's statement that it included the authority "to take
whatever action he deems necessary to adjust imports . . .
[including use of] tariffs, quotas, import taxes or other meth-
ods of import restrictions."9 Although the Court in Algonquin
did not explicitly address the question of the legality of the
previous quota system, it may be assumed to have been up-
held, sub silentio, since the question presented was whether the
President's authority extended beyond the imposition of quan-
titative controls.
Although the authority to impose quotas under section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act is not susceptible to serious legal
6. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, supra note 2.
The Executive Branch has consistently taken the position that the continuing
validity of a national security investigation and finding provides a basis for subsequent
amendments to the original action without the necessity of additional investigations
being conducted. In this respect, numerous modifications to the original MOIP have
been implemented, including the substitution of a system of license fees for the
quota/allocation system in 1973, without conducting additional national security in-
vestigations. Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 11 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation). The Attor-
ney General also concluded in a formal opinion issued in 1975 that, although permissi-
ble if desired, no additional national security investigation was legally required in
order for President Ford to impose supplemental fees on oil imports despite the
changes in world oil markets occurring after the OPEC oil embargo. 43 Op. Arr'v GEN.
3 (1975).
6.1 40 Fed. Reg. 3965 (1975).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1976).
8. FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 561-71 (1975).
9. Id. at 564.
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question, a possible legal issue exists as to whether an auction
of the quota tickets, or some other form of allocation, is within
the authority of the President. However, any grant of executive
power carries an implicit authority to implement that power,
and a quota or other form of quantitative restriction cannot be
implemented without a concomitant mechanism for the distri-
bution of the limited quantities which are allowed to be im-
ported.'0 Under the quota system established in 1959, the
mechanism chosen was an allocation to refiners and importers
based on amounts they historically imported; however, there is
nothing in the legislative history which would dictate such a
result or which would preclude some other distribution mecha-
nism, such as an auction, from being adopted." Considering
that allocations based on historical volumes have several dele-
terious effects, including their inherent anticompetitive nature
and the enforcement difficulties they pose, there are excellent
policy reasons for the adoption of a distribution mechanism
other than an allocation system. As a consequence, an auction
of import rights would most likely be viewed as within the
realm of necessary action required to be exercised as part of the
authority conferred.
HISTORY OF THE MOIP
As previously noted, the MOIP was created in March 1959
by Proclamation 3279. It replaced a system of voluntary con-
trols that had failed to prevent oil imports from increasing. At
that time, such imports were approximately half the price of
domestic crude oil.'2 Initially, quota levels were established for
different products and regions of the country in accordance
with then current levels of imports. Allocations of crude oil
import licenses were granted to all refiners, regardless of
whether or not they actually imported crude oil.'3 This system
ensured that the value of quota licenses was evenly distributed
and not received solely by coastal refiners, which would have
given them a large competitive advantage. Allocations of petro-
leum products, such as residual fuel oil, were granted to certain
classes of importers.
10. Id. at 559.
11. See generally 101 CONG. REc. 5298 (1955) (remarks of Sen. Barkley); 101 CONG.
REC. 5588 (1955).
12. See generally Pres. Proc. No. 3279, supra note 2.
13. Inland refiners realized the value of the licenses by arranging exchanges of oil
with actual importers.
1979
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The effectiveness of the quota in limiting imports ulti-
mately proved to be its downfall. Reduced imports resulted in
greater demand for domestic production; however, once excess
capacity was utilized, additional demand induced inflationary
impacts. 4 As a consequence, political pressure grew to alter the
system either to include additional persons seeking to share in
the growing monetary value of the import licenses or to increase
quota levels and thereby lower the indirect, and increasingly
controversial, subsidy to the domestic petroleum industry.
The controversy which quotas engendered led to the deci-
sion in April 1973 to issue Presidential Proclamation 4210,
which provided for the gradual replacement of quotas by a
system of licenses subject to fees which would be available to
all importers.'5 The Proclamation established a fee of $0.21 per
barrel for crude oil and $0.63 per barrel for petroleum pro-
ducts.'" The difference between the two fees, $0.42, became the
effective per barrel level of protection for domestic refining
capacity. Newly constructed refining capacity also was granted
a five-year exemption from the fee on 75% of inputs, which
meant that such capacity would have a total level of protection
equaling $0.573 per barrel.'7 Existing quota levels were contin-
ued in the form of fee-exempt licenses but were subject to being
decreased annually by a specified amount until their complete
elimination in 1980.' 8 However, the quota levels for certain
products (e.g., residual fuel oil. imported into the east coast)
had previously been set at such high levels that only a rela-
tively small amount of such imports are currently subject to
the fee."
In January 1975, President Ford imposed a supplemental
fee on all imports based on the failure of Congress to pass
legislation in response to the energy crisis in the aftermath
which followed the 1973-74 oil embargo. Presidential Procla-
mation 4341 provided for an initial supplemental fee of $1.00
per barrel, which was to be increased in$1.00 increments to a
maximum of $3.00 per barrel. 20 The passage of the Energy Pol-
14. SPECIAL COMMrrEE To INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, REPORT (Mar. 6, 1959).
15. Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation).
16. Id. at 243.
17. Id. at 245.
18. Id. at 248-49.
19. See Pres. Proc. No. 3389, 3 C.F.R. 108 (1959-1963 Compilation).
20. Pres. Proc. No. 4341, 3 C.F.R. 431, 433 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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icy and Conservation Act 2' in December of 1975 allowed the
President to rescind the supplemental fee in Presidential Pro-
clamation 4412 at a time when it had only reached $2.00 per
barrel.2 2 Since that time, there have been no substantial modi-
fications to the MOIP.
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
Part 213 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
contains the regulations governing the MOIP. Under the regu-
lations, fee-exempt licenses are annually allocated2' within the
overall levels specified to applicants based on their inputs dur-
ing a base period.24 The number of fee-exempt licenses for each
product is specified by geographical regions.25
The Proclamation and the regulations also preserve cer-
tain exemptions for "long term allocations" granted in the
1960's to provide incentives for the construction of petrochemi-
cal facilities in Puerto Rico 2 and the Virgin Islands.2 Persons
holding long term allocations are not affected by the sliding
scale reducing fee-exempt imports, nor by any other provision
that could impair their rights.28
Persons not qualifying for a fee-exempt allocation, or who
do not receive a sufficient allocation to cover the quantity of
oil that they currently import, must apply for licenses subject
to the $0.21 or $0.63 per barrel fee, as appropriate.2
Procedures for exceptions from Part 213 are contained in
Part 205, Subpart D. These provisions implement the authority
contained in section 5 of the Proclamation which provides that
exceptions may be granted on various grounds, including where
payment of the fees would represent an "exceptional hard-
ship. '30 Appendix I of Subpart D contains guidelines given
particular consideration in the disposition of exception re-
21. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 89 Stat. 871 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 42, 50 U.S.C.).
22. 41 Fed. Reg. 1037 (1976).
23. Oil Import Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 213.3 (1978).
24. Id. at 213.9-11.
25. Id. at 213.12.
26. Pres. Proc. No. 3693, 3 C.F.R. 153 (1964-1965 Compilation).
27. Pres. Proc. No. 3820, 3 C.F.R. 165 (1967-1970 Compilation).
28. Pres. Proc. No. 3279(9) as amended by Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-
1963 Compilation), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 1862, at 546 (1976).
29. Pres. Proc. No. 3279(3)(a)(1) as currently amended by Pres. Proc. No. 4210,
suora at 543.
30. 10 C.F.R. § 205.50 (1978).
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quests. The guidelines authorize exceptions where, for exam-
ple, imposition of fees would lead to a result unintended by the
Proclamation or would seriously impair the operations of prof-
itability of the applicant's business.
3
CURRENT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM
Since the adoption of the original program, the world oil
market and its relationship to the U.S. oil market have
changed fundamentally. The Arab oil embargo, the subsequent
several-fold increase in foreign oil prices, and the price controls
under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973
(EPAA), as amended, 3 have completely altered the economic
positioris of persons affected by the MOI. When the license
fee program was initiated in 1973, world crude oil prices were
less than domestic prices and were expected to be roughly
aligned in the future. Those events resulted in an oil market
where a substantial portion of U.S. crude oil has been priced
at levels well below world market prices3 and arguably does not
require the additional protection afforded by the MOIP.
Although the protection offered by the MOIP is currently
overshadowed by the effects of domestic price controls, the
MOIP remains the only long term vehicle for encouraging the
construction of domestic refinery capacity and the protection
of crude oil production. Therefore, once these controls expire,
the MOIP will most likely play an increasingly important role
in the regulation of U.S. oil imports.
OTHER STATUTORY AUTHORITIES WHICH COULD BE UTILIZED To
CONTROL OIL IMPORTS
There are several other statutory authorities under which
the President could conceivably take action to control oil im-
ports. Section 456 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) provides that the President may implement a proce-
dure by which "the United States may exercise the exclusive
right to import and purchase all or any part of crude oil...
and refined petroleum products of foreign origin for resale in
the United States. 14 Implementation of this authority requires
congressional approval as an Energy Action under section 551
31. Id. § 205.5, app. II.
32. Energy Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-56 (1976).
33. The value of lower-priced domestic crude oil is allocated to refiners under the
Domestic Crude Oil Allocation ("Entitlements") Program. See Mandatory Petroleum
Allocation Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 211.67 (1978).
34. Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 456, 15 U.S.C. § 760b(a) (1976).
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of EPCA.n1 Section 456 requires that the President buy and
sell without profit or loss, except for individual cases which
"result in progress toward a lower price for oil sold in interna-
tional commerce."3 In addition, the President must find that
the use of such authority "is likely to reduce prices for imported
oils." The range of action that the President could take to
limit imports under this provision is therefore quite narrow and
it has never been implemented.
Section 101 of the Defense Production Act, as amended,
provides that the President may "allocate materials . .. to
such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to pro-
mote the national defense." Aside from the fact that civilian
allocations must be based on historical supply patterns, there
are three major legal and practical obstacles to utilizing this
authority to control oil imports. First, "national defense" is
defined in the Act to mean military, atomic, or directly related
activity. 9 It is a more difficult standard to meet than the broad
"national security" objectives which allow use of the Trade
Expansion Act authority. Second, the purpose of the Act is to
"allocate" supplies needed for national defense resulting from
shortages, not to create shortages by restricting imports.'" Fi-
nally, the authority may not be used "to control the general
distribution of any material in the civilian market" unless it is
a "scarce and critical material essential to the national de-
fense" and defense requirements cannot otherwise be met."
Normal market conditions would not appear to meet this stan-
dard, although it would most likely be met during an oil em-
bargo.
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), the President may declare a national emergency to
deal with any "unusual or extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States,
to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States."'" Upon the declaration of a national emer-
35. Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 551, 42 U.S.C. § 6421 (1976).
36. Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 456, supra note 34, at § 760b(c).
37. Id. at § 760b(d).
38. Defense Production Act of 1950 § 101, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a)(2) (1970).
39. Defense Production Act of 1950 § 762(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(d) (1970).
40. See Defense Production Act of 1950 § 2, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2662 (1970).
41. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1953 § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(b)
(1970).
42. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. supp. § 1701(a)
(1978).
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gency, IEEPA permits the President to "investigate, regulate,
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any...
importation . . . of . . . any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest."13 The President
is required "in every possible instance" to consult with Con-
gress before exercising the authority and to submit a report to
Congress explaining his action." Although the emergency ac-
tion is subject to several additional procedural requirements,
the only one that poses a serious constraint on the President's
authority is the right of Congress to terminate the emergency
by concurrent resolution at any time.4" In the event of a na-
tional emergency, the authority contained in the IEEPA could,
therefore, be used in addition to the authority contained in the
Trade Expansion Act to control oil imports.
43. Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
44. Id. § 1703(a).
45. Id. § 1706(b).
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